Using all waves of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) dataset, we compute an affective polarization score for 143,857 individuals and aggregate these scores in 190 regions nested in 30 countries, across a period ranging from 1996 to 2019, covering 105 elections. This research note investigates the scope of regional variations in levels of affective polarization across Europe and contrasts it to national scores to highlight the theoretical and empirical interest of a disaggregated approach. Rachel Hartman and colleagues review interventions designed to reduce partisan animosity in the United States and introduce a framework to categorize interventions across three levels: thoughts, relationships and institutions. We also explore the challenges of durability and scalability, examine self-fulfilling polarization and interventions that backfire, and discuss future directions for reducing partisan animosity. Our review encompasses both interventions conducted as part of academic research projects and real-world interventions led by practitioners in non-profit organizations. We introduce the TRI framework to capture three levels of intervention-thoughts (correcting misconceptions and highlighting commonalities), relationships (building dialogue skills and fostering positive contact) and institutions (changing public discourse and transforming political structures)-and connect these levels by highlighting the importance of motivation and mobilization.
Here we provide a multi-level review of interventions designed to reduce partisan animosity, which we define as negative thoughts, feelings and behaviours towards a political outgroup. Rising partisan animosity is associated with a reduction in support for democracy and an increase in support for political violence. These findings shed considerable light on the nature and depth of modern partisan polarization.
We find pronounced willingness by both Democrats and Republicans to dehumanize members of the out-party. Participants were exposed to identical information about a melee at a gathering, with the partisanship of those involved randomly assigned. Finally, we present a survey experiment offering causal leverage to examine openness to dehumanization in the processing of new information about misdeeds by in- and out-partisans. We also show that dehumanization “predicts” partisan motivated reasoning and is correlated with respondent worldview. We examine the relationship between dehumanization and other key partisan intensity measures, finding that it is most closely related to extreme affective polarization. This uncovers striking, consistent observational evidence that many partisans dehumanize members of the opposing party. We begin by looking at two different measures of dehumanization (one subtle and one more direct). Applying insights from recent work in social psychology, we employ three novel large-N, broadly representative online surveys, fielded over the course of 4 years, across two presidential administrations, to examine the extent to which this brand of polarization features a willingness to apply dehumanizing metaphors to out-partisans. The affective, identity based, and often negative nature of partisan polarization in the United States has been a subject of much scholarly attention.
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